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Science and science policy 
Human perceptual systems accomplish feats of veridicality. To be sure, there are 
occasional illusions and misperceptions, carefully registered and analysed in re-
search institutes such as IPO, but the astonishing fact is that, under a wide range 
of conditions, our senses yield truthful representations of objects and events in 
an ever-changing environment. There is immediate categorisation of what is fixed, 
constant, permanent, essential, and this knowledge provides veridical guidance for 
often equally immediate decisions and actions. This, with language, is one of evo-
lution's most precious gifts to mankind. 
But evolution has been less generous to the mind's eye, in particular as regards 
our ability to discern scientific truths immediately in the ever-changing flood of 
potentially relevant data. In fact, that ability is nonexistent. Approaching truth 
in science is a slow and highly unpredictable process, one which is beset by illu-
sions and misconceptions. Only time is a filter comparable to the senses: After the 
fads, the rhetoric, the personal and public interests have died away, it becomes 
increasingly clear what progress has been made in terms of lasting contributions to 
science. Twenty-five years is a relatively narrow band-width for this filter. 
Still, when it is applied to IPO, one detects the contours of some major theoreti-
cal developments which are generally viewed as 'classics' (Some of these highlights 
are discussed in '25 jaar IPO', Eindhoven: IPO, 1982). 
The disquieting (for some) but instructive aspect of this is that none of these 
developments could have been predicted 25 years ago. The mind's eye is completely 
blind to future knowledge. If one did, moreover, try to trace back how a particular 
scientific insight came into existence, one would find a bewildering gamma of idio-
syncratic accidentals, none of which in itself could have been known in advance to 
play a crucial role in the process. 
This makes research management a difficult, or -depending on one's perspective- an 
easy job: One cannot do much about steering the process. There are no tested and 
proved strategies. No planning, however intelligent, can guarantee success. 
This state of affairs, though nothing new in science, is becoming increasingly dis-
quieting to science policy makers. Public pressure is building up to 'exert con-
trol' over the advancement of knowledge, to make the process less erratic and more 
predictable. The worst, and most ridiculous version of such 'control' is to assign 
scientists the task of proving a pre-established scientific 'truth', such as a 
racist, Marxist, or feminist ideology. Leaving such excesses out of consideration, 
however, one can also detect more subtle ways in which governments and funding 
agencies try to influence the course and the degree of success of scientific dis-
covery. There can be no doubt that some of these efforts are exercised with the 
best of intentions: The promotion of science is still widely recognised as a maxim 
of our culture. Still, the form such promotion takes is at times impractical, at 
other times based on false assumptions. Some of these assumptions acquire the sta-
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tus of idols, worshipped equally by science policy makers, administrators and 
scientists. But at least the latter should speak the truth, even when this leads to 
disharmony with public opinion or to jeopardising the flow of funds. Moreover, it 
may well be that the worshipping of idols will in the long run boomerang and harm 
science itself. In the following I want to mention three idols whose worshipping I 
would not recommend to scientists. 
Three idols 
The research proposal idol 
Only research which is cast in a neat research proposal, outlining theory, methods, 
expected findings, and timing, can be expected to yield significant results. There 
is no doubt that the writing of research proposals can perform useful functions in 
the promotion of science. It forces the scientist to relate his or her ideas to 
whatever is around in the literature, and it gives the indispensible scientific fo-
rum a chance to interfere even during the conception of a research project. Also, 
it makes the scientist 'funds-conscious': In the best case, he or she will consider 
whether the expected scientific gain is reasonable related to the financial re-
quirements of the project. All this I grant; still, the general claim is patently 
false. Its falsity follows from the above-mentioned in-principle unpredictability 
of future knowledge. If one always required a scientist to predict his scientific 
results, or to predict the direction of these results, or even only to outline the 
problems, and if one at the same time required him to stay within the limits of 
these predictions or outlines, this would be a death-blow to scientific progress. A 
good research project will, as a rule, yield unexpected results, and progress in 
science is best served by allowing the scientist to follow these leads, i.e. to de-
fine a new problem and to steer in a different direction. Happily enough, funding 
agencies are often aware of this and do not bother too much about mismatches be-
tween the proposal and the actual work carried out. But then one wonders whether 
the present research proposal cult, which is growing out of all bounds, is not 
really a liturgy rendering homage to an idol, and only serving the public illusion 
that the scientific progress can be 'controlled'. 
The interdisciplinarity idol 
Interdisciplinary research is better than monodisciplinary research. Dissatisfac-
tion with scientific progress within certain disciplines, and general dislike of an 
'ivory tower mentality' may be at the root of strong public pressure towards inter-
disciplinary research. If a scientist is only put into a situation where he is 
forced to consider problems, theories, and methods other than the traditional ones 
of his own field, new vistas of scientific progress will automatically emerge. To 
be sure, the recent history of science has witnessed the growth of highly success-
ful interdisciplinary fields, such as biochemistry, biophysics, and psycholinguis-
tics. But in my view, this has nothing to do with interdisciplinary per se. The 
viability of an interdisciplinary field depends on whether or not it cuts nature at 
its joints, i.e. whether the systems and processes studied are sufficiently autono-
mous and specific to warrant research in their own right. Interdisciplinary re-
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search may equally well lead away from such 'islands of nature' as towards them. 
There is an additional confusion here, which should be carefully distinguished. It-
is popular these days to say that research should be 'problem-oriented' (another 
idol), and that 'problems' usually defy traditional boundaries between disci-
plines. The comprehensive study of traffic problems, minority problems, or rehabi-
litation problems, for instance, obviously requires expertise from different disci-
plines simultaneoulsy. Therefore, 'problem-oriented' research requires interdisci-
plinarity. Though this is obviously true, the starting-point is less convincing, 
i.e. that real science should be 'problem-oriented' in the suggested sense. I will 
turn to this issue when discussing the next and last idol. Here it suffices to say 
that striving for interdisciplinarity as such amounts to trying to exert control 
over science by sheer magic. 
The relevance idol 
The promotion of science is best served by giving priority to the study of urgent 
problems in our society (there then follows an unbiassed listing of these pro-, 
blems). Though not dead, this idol has lost much of its revolutionary appeal over 
the last ten or fifteen years; its falseness is too apparent. I will not repeat the 
arguments here, but rather consider some offspring of the idol which are still 
alive and kicking, and which find considerable support among scientists them-
selves. The keywords are 'problem-oriented' and 'applied' science. As for 'problem-
oriented' research, its meaning is dependent on what is taken to be a 'problem'. 
Usually, it takes the form of 'an urgent problem in our society', which brings us 
back to the relevance idol. At the other extreme a 'problem' can be anything aris-
ing from science itself, such as the chemical structure of DNA, universal proper-
ties of syntax, or the recognition of words. In that case, 'problem-oriented 
science' is just a faddish way of saying 'science'. Between these two extremes lies 
a third use of the term: A problem is any issue external to science which draws at-
tention. This may or may not be a 'socially relevant' issue, a practical issue, an 
aesthetic one, etc. 'Problem-oriented research' is, then, the scientific analysis 
of such an issue. This sense of the term is, as far as I can see, indistinguishable 
from what is usually called 'applied research'. So let us limit the discussion to 
the question of whether applied research should be a privileged way to promote 
science. That there is a general move these days away from basic and towards ap-
plied research is a given, and I have always taken this as the unhappy result of 
funds drying up and scientists wanting to stay alive. This is regrettable, but not 
insincere. What disturbs me is to hear scientists proclaim that applied research is 
so exceptionally good for science. The Dutch Psychonomic Society, for example, is 
organising a conference on metatheoretical aspects of psychonomic research - a lau-
dable initiative. However, a major part of this conference is dedicated to applied 
research. Why? Is one really presupposing that applied research has some intrinsic 
theoretical role to play in the scientific analysis of mental processes? This would 
be utterly off the mark. It is sheer luck when an applied problem reveals the exis-
tence of an hitherto unknown principle of mental (or, for that matter, of biologi-
cal or physical) organisation. Almost any readily observable phenomenon or problem 
is the resultant of complex interactions. This fact does not preclude their scien-
tific analysis, but this is not the most straightforward way to discover the laws 
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of nature. The latter requires abstraction from interactions, irrelevant variables, 
and the like. Louis Pasteur must have had this in mind when he remarked that there 
are no applied sciences, only applications of science. It is true that applied re-
search can sensitise a scientist's mind to potentially important variables. But 
here applied research is on a par with occasional observations, talking to collea-
gues, having dreams, reading books, etc. They are among the ingredients from which 
the highly associative creative process in science draws; but there is no special 
status here for applied research. It would be untruthful to proclaim this, and it 
will in the end hinder the advancement of science if politicians capitalise on such 
proclamations. 
Just a last point here: I am a staunch supporter of applied research. There is a 
host of problems in our complex society which cannot be solved without applying the 
best of our scientific tools and methods. This should be done, and it should be 
done well. But one should not confuse it with science. 
A goddess: the freedom of science 
Science is free in the sense that it is disinterested. It approaches truth whatever 
the consequences. An unpopular, dangerous, or socially irrelevant truth is just as 
valuable in science as a popular, useful, or relevant truth. The only thing that 
counts is the internal dynamics of the inquiry. In last instance, this freedom has 
to be realised in the individual scientist's mind. This is not a luxury, but rather 
a responsibility, one which is becoming increasingly hard to live up to under grow-
ing public pressure and with a falling economic tide. Freedom of science is, like 
democracy, not a self-evident permanent characteristic of our society. It is vul-
nerable, and it needs continuous defence both within the scientific community it-
self and before the general public. 
At the same time, the disinterestedness of the inquiry can in no way serve as an 
excuse for the scientist to refrain from signalling potential abuses of his re-
sults. In fact, public arguments against the freedom of science have often address-
ed scientists' neglect of this duty. But one should not throw out the baby with the 
bathwater. 
Bow can science policy promote the advancement of knowledge? There is, first, the 
domain of applied research. Governments can promote the study of urgent societal 
problems, they can define desired results, technical developments and the like. 
Second, science policy can consist of setting priorities for fundamental research, 
stimulating one discipline or subdiscipline rather more than others. The heart of 
the matter here, however, is to create a maximum of freedom of whatever science is 
to be promoted. Every move to exert control over the course of the inquiry itself 
is doomed to be counterproductive. 
An especially effective way of realising these boundary conditions for fundamental 
research is the establishment of research institutes with longterm funding and in-
dependent internal definition of the research program. This is, to a good approxi-
mation, the structure of IPO, and it has been put to good use. 
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